Liesbet, Heyvaert (2000) “Gerundive Nominalization: From Type Specification to Grounded Instance” in Constructions in Cognitive Linguistics: Selected Papers from Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, Amsterdam 1997 (eds.) Ad Foolen & Frederike van der Leek: 103-121. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamin Publishing Company.

Langacker suggests that in a verb group “the specification of tense and modality be analysed as the grounding predication, with the remainder of the group (other auxiliaries and the main verb) regarded as complex clausal head analogous to a head noun.” (1991: 95) – 106

Even though each auxiliary element imposes its own profile on the main verb and thereby derives a higher-order type specification, it is only “the leftmost verb in sequence” (Langacker 1991: 96) which determines the profile of the entire verb group. – 107

action nominals seem to “focus on the event as a physical activity” (e.g. Sam’s washing of the windows was meticulous, Langacker 1991: 32), whereas gerundive nominals seem to imply that the designated events has occurred, that it is a ‘fact’ (e.g. Sam’s washing of the windows was shock to everybody, Langacker 1991: 32) – 118-119

Hampe, Beate (2000) “Facing up to the Meaning of ‘face up to’: A Cognitive Semantico-Pragmatic Analysis of an English Verb-Particle Construction” in Constructions in Cognitive Linguistics: Selected Papers from Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, Amsterdam 1997 (eds.) Ad Foolen & Frederike van der Leek: 81-101. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamin Publishing Company.

in cognitive grammar terms, in each of these transitive constructions the subject-NP instantiates a trajectory whose ‘active zone’ (the face or front) is situated opposite a landmark which is instantiated by the direct object NP. – 86

It comes as a no surprise that humans can face abstract things the same way as they do concrete objects once the vast and complex conceptual background that is provided by the EVENT-STRUCTURE metaphor is taken for granted. – 86

Sometimes, both literal reading and the reading under the EVENT-STRUCTURE metaphor are simultaneously possible. – 87

the object NPs instantiating the landmark mainly stemmed from the semantic fields of difficulties and problems, indicating that the EVENT-STRUCTURE metaphor indeed provides the basis for the extension of the meaning of ‘to face’. – 87

The particle up in its central sense denotes verticality in oriented physical space, a notion that has arisen out of our bodily experience (of gravity), i.e. the relative position of head and feet to each other when we stand, sit or move. Thus, an experiential correlation exists between verticality and being awake, active and conscious; giving rise to such well-known conceptual metaphors as ACTIVE IS UP, WELL-BEING IS UP, RATIONAL IS UP, CONTROL IS UP. – 89

We can state that the use of up is due to the conceptual metaphor CLOSE IS UP, which captures the experiential fact that things which come closer to an observer rise in his/her visual field, as in: ‘She came up to me.’

any entity approaching another entity being the deictic centre can be seen as coming up the latter. up, therefore, can denote “increasing proximity” or the movement of a trajector to a landmark that is the deictic centre. – 90

Dancygier, Barbara (2000) “How Polish Structure Space: Prepositions, Direction Nouns, Case, and Metaphor” in Constructions in Cognitive Linguistics: Selected Papers from Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, Amsterdam 1997 (eds.) Ad Foolen & Frederike van der Leek: 27-45. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamin Publishing Company.

on is not commonly associated with two-dimensional regions and with concepts such as ‘support’ or ‘attachment’. – 30

spatial construals arise on the basis of information offered by all the relevant subsystems, rather than by any of the system alone. – 30

Athanasiadou, Angeliki & Dirven, Rene (2000) “Pragmatic Conditionals” in Constructions in Cognitive Linguistics: Selected Papers from Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, Amsterdam 1997. (eds.) Ad Foolen & Frederike van der Leek: Pgs. 1- 26. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamin Publishing Company.

Very often the term pragmatics is used only in relation to speech acts, but its original meaning, as specified by Charles Morris (1946), is much wider. Morris made the distinction between syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics, such that each level involves different relations: syntactics specifies the relations between the signs themselves, semantics specifies the relations between signs and the world, and pragmatics specifies the relations between signs and their users. – 2

Whereas the logical conditionals involve analytical reasoning processes, and as a result the antecedent can only be preposed to the consequent, conversational conditionals involve speech acts in actual discourse or aspects of the discourse such as metalinguistic references to the linguistic choices made by the speakers and the antecedent tends to be postposed. – 5

Berger, Peter L. & Luckman, Thomas (1966) Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on Sociology of Knowledge. London: Penguin Books.

Society determines the presence but not the nature of ideas. -  20

human knowledge is given in society as an a priori to individual experience, providing the latter with its order of meaning. This order, although it is relative to a particular socio-historical situation, appears to the individual as the natural way of looking at the world. Scheler called this ‘relative-natural worldview’ of a society. – 20

Weber observes: ‘Both for the sociology in the present sense, and for history, the object of cognition is the subjective meaning-complex of action. – 30

Every name implies a nomenclature, which in turn implies a designated social location. To be given an identity involves being assigned a specific place in the world. As this identity is subjectively appropriated by the child, so is the world to which this identity points. Subjective appropriation of identity and subjective appropriation of the social world are merely different aspects of the same process of internalization, mediated by the same significant others. – 152

two general types of reality maintenance – routine maintenance and crisis maintenance. The former is designed to maintain the internalized reality in everyday life, the latter in situations of crisis. – 168

It would, therefore, be a mistake to assume that only significant others serve to maintain subjective reality. But significant others occupy a central position in the economy of reality-maintenance. They are particularly important for the ongoing confirmation of that crucial element of reality we call identity. – 170

The significant others in the individual’s life are the principal agents for the maintenance of his subjective reality. Less significant others functions as a sort of chorus. – 170

The relation between the significant others and the ‘chorus’ in reality-maintenance is a dialectical one; that is, they interact with each other as well as with the subjective reality they serve to confirm. A solidly negative identification on the part of the wider milieu may eventually affect the identification offered by the significant others. – 171

the significant others may eventually have an effect on the wider milieu – a ‘loyal’ wife can be an asset in several ways as the individual seeks to get across a certain identity to his business associates. Reality-maintenance and reality-confirmation thus involve the totality of the individual’s social situation, though the significant others occupy a privileged position in these processes. – 171

language objectifies the world, transforming the panta rhei of experience into a cohesive order. In the establishment of this order language realizes a world, in the double sense of apprehending and producing it. Conversation is the actualizing of this realizing efficiency of language in the face-to-face situations of individual existence. In conversation the objectification of language become objects of individual consciousness. Thus the fundamental reality-maintaining fact is the continuing use of the same language to objectify unfolding biographical experience. In the widest sense, all who employ this same language are reality-maintaining others. – 173

Eagleton, Terry "Literary Theory: An Introduction"

phenomenological criticism aims instead at a wholly ‘immanent’ reading of the text, totally unaffected by anything outside of it. – 51

Lakoff, George (2004) Don’t Think of an Elephant: Know your Values and Frame the Debate: The Essential Guide for Progressive. Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing

When we negate a frame, we evoke the frame. – 03

When you are arguing against the other side: Do not use their language. Their language picks out a frame – and it won’t be the frame you want. – 03

Framing is about language that fits your worldview. It is not just language. The ideas are primary – and the language carries those ideas, evokes those ideas. – 04

A do-gooder is someone who is trying to help someone else rather than herself and is getting in the way of those who are pursuing their self-interest. Do-gooders screw up the system. – 08

To be accepted, the truth must fit people’s frames. If the facts do not fit the frame, the frames stays and the facts bounce off. – 17

Concepts are not things that can be changed just by someone telling us a fact. We may be presented with facts, but for us to make sense of them, they have to fit what is already in the synapses of the brain. – 17

If you keep their language and their framing and just argue against it, you lose from your perspective. – 33

Each of us, in the premotor cortex of our brains, has what one called mirror neurons. Such neurons fire either we perform an action or when we see the same action performed by someone else. There are connections from that part of the brain to the emotional centers. Such neural circuits are believed to be basis of empathy. – 54

One of the fundamental findings of cognitive science is that people think in terms of frames and metaphors – conceptual structures like those we have been describing. The frames are in the synapses of our brains, physically present in the form of neural circuitry. When the facts don’t fit the frames, the frames are kept and facts ignored. - 73

Reframing is not just about words and language. Reframing is about ideas. The ideas have to be place in people’s brains before the sound bite can make any sense. – 105