Harris, Roy (1998) “Writing and Proto-writing: From Sign to Metasign” in Integrational Linguistics: A First Reader (eds.) Roy Harris & George Wolf: 261-269. Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd.

Any object with a surface which can be marked has the potential for use in communication in two possible ways:

(i) The object itself retains ‘semiotic neutrality’ merely providing a convenient surface for the inscription of a sign or signs.

(ii) The object itself functions as a sign, as well as acting as the bearer of a further (inscribed) sign or signs. 

            The latter possibility subdivided at its simplest into:

(iia) The object itself functions as emblem and the inscribed mark as token, or

(iib) The object itself functions as token and the inscribed mark as emblem. - 268

Harris, Roy (1998) “The Semiology of Textualization” in Integrational Linguistics: A First Reader (eds.) Roy Harris & George Wolf: 227-240. Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd.

The term semantic enclave is defined by Wallis as ‘the part of a work of art which consists of signs of a different kind or from a different system than the sign of which the main body of that work of art consists.’ – 228

What constitute a sign is not given independently of the situation in which it occurs or of its material manifestation in that situation. – 238

the value of a sign is a function of the integrational proficiency which its identification and interpretation presuppose. – 238

Sign behavior as such cannot be treated simply as the exercise of individual choice from among a pre-determined inventory or system of signs. On the contrary, the status of being a sign is itself relative to a communication situation and determined by relevant features of that situation. Signs, in brief, are defined for an integrational semiology by communicational relevance in a situation and not by criteria for membership of some previously established typology. – 23

Taylor, Talbot J. (1998) “Do you understand? Criteria of understanding in Verbal Interaction” in Integrational Linguistics: A First Reader (eds.) Roy Harris & George Wolf: 198-208. Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd.

“To make the words serviceable to the end of communication, it is necessary that they excite, in the Hearer, exactly the same Idea, they stand for in the mind of the Speaker. Without this, Men fill one another’s Heads with noise and sound; but convey not thereby their Thoughts, and lay not before one another their Ideas, which is the end of Discourse and Language.” (Locke 1690, Book III, Ch. 9, Section 6). – 198

We can never know, Locke argues, if the ideas we signify by certain words are the same as  our hearers signify by the very same words. Consequently, we can never be certain that our hearers receive the thoughts we intend by our utterances to convey. That is, the ‘imperfection of words’ consists in the fact that, because the understanding of words is a private, mental event, they do not provide speakers with a means of knowing whether their words are being correctly understood. – 199

From Saussure’s conventionalist point of view, we may be certain that all speakers of the same language link the same ‘signifies’ with the same ‘signifiants’ because that connection is arbitrarily imposed on them by the conventions of their language. Saussure’s reply to Locke’s worries about the intersubjectivity of the connection between words and ideas was to argue, in effect, that speakers and hearers do not possess any ideas other than those given to them by the signs of their language. – 199-200

Toolan, Michael (1998) “On Inscribed or Literal Meaning” in Integrational Linguistics: A First Reader (eds.) Roy Harris & George Wolf: 143-158. Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd.

Literal, Conventional and Utterance Meaning

Searle on literal meaning relative to a background

Compositionalism

The Pragmaticist Tradition

Integrational Linguistics

Prototype

Concluding Remarks

The communicative event postulated by Wittgenstein fulfills the three criteria for the speech act to be ironical: the proposition is inappropriate (‘false’), it was ‘meant’ to be inappropriate, thus there is the requisition intention, and it is ‘known’ to be inappropriate – there is no mention of deceit, as there would be if the speaker was simply lying. – 160

Harris, Roy (1998) “Three Models of Significance” in Integrational Linguistics: A First Reader (eds.) Roy Harris & George Wolf: 113-125. Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd.

1. Introduction

2. The surrogational model

As the term surrogational implies, the defining feature of this model is that signification is explained in terms of the sign being a surrogate or substitute for something else. According to this theory, the sign ‘stands for’ what it signifies. – 114

Words may be regarded as surrogates for physical objects, actions, etc. Alternatively, words may be regarded as surrogates for ideas or mental processes. In the former case the meaning is taken to be the corresponding object, action, etc. In the second case meaning is taken to be the corresponding concept.

            These two approaches may be termed reocentric and psychocentric surrogationalism. – 115

Triangle of Signification: Signification is construed in terms of three interconnected dyadic relations; those between sign and concept, sign and object, object and concept. – 116

3. The structural model

Whereas surrogationalism seek to explain signification in terms of relations between signs and non-signs, the structural model explains it solely in terms of relations between signs and other signs. – 117

4. The integrational model

It (Integrational semiology) starts from the more modest thesis that no act of communication is contextless and every act of communication is uniquely contextualized. – 119

the integrationist does not assume that the sign has any existence outside the communication situation which gives rise to it. – 119

from an integrational point of view the only a priori determinacy a sign has is contextual determinacy, and contexts are open-ended. -119

5. Signification, epistemology and science

6. Conclusion

Harris, Roy (1998) “The Integrational Critique of Orthodox Linguistics” in Integrational Linguistics: A First Reader (eds.) Roy Harris & George Wolf: 15-26. Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd.

Introduction

if language is viewed not as an activity at all but as a faculty or ability which underlies the activity and makes it possible, the dilemma of conflicting definitions simply reappears at one remove. For there is no way of identifying the language faculty without reference to the activity which it is alleged to sponsor. – 15-16

Let segregational linguistics treat language as autonomous system, examine their interval relations, and perhaps speculate at a very abstract level about how such systems might be represented in the human brain, while integrational linguistics will concentrate on the external relations between languages and the individuals and communities using them. – 17

The philosophical basis of the integrationist position is the thesis that the linguistic universe is populated not by mysteriously unobservable objects called ‘language’ but by observable human beings who somehow and sometimes manage to communicate with one another. – 19

A sign is any observable feature or complex of features which, by virtue of its integrational function, plays role in our diverse but continuous practices of making sense. The sole necessary and sufficient condition for the constitution of a sign is our recognition of this role. – 19

From an integrational point of view, language arises from the creative use of communicational space in which we live, and speaking and writing are only two of the many human activities which articulate this space. – 19

The segregationist response

Three misconception of indeterminacy

The indeterminacy of linguistic sign

Harris, Roy (1998) “Language as a Social Interaction: Integrationalism versus Segregationalism” in Integrational Linguistics: A First Reader (eds.) Roy Harris & George Wolf: 5-45. Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd.

As Silverstein did in an article published as recently as 1977, that certain ‘cultural prerequisites’, as he called them, need to be taken into account for purposes of grammatical analysis. In other words, if the linguist is to give a full and satisfactory account of native speakers’ mastery of their language, that account cannot ignore the speakers’ awareness of certain context-dependent social practices that must be presupposed if certain type of linguistic expression are to make any kind of sense at all. – 6

Segregational analysis treats language and languages as objects of study existing in their own right, independently of other varieties of communication and amenable to description in terms that are quite separate from those used in any other discipline. – 6

the integrational approach, sees language as manifested in a complex of human abilities and activities that are all integrated in social interaction, often intricately so and in such a manner that it makes little sense to segregate the linguistic from the non-linguistic components. – 6