We learn who we
are as private or public citizens by seeing ourselves reflected in images, and
we learn who we can become by transporting ourselves into images. – 1
Images work on us
synchronically and diachronically. Synchronically, we view the image that
represents the present. Diachronic viewing are slightly more complicated, for
we view an image that represents the past and was created in the past, but we
also view contemporaneous images with a knowledge of their precursors and their
previous meanings. – 12-13
I.
Intertextuality
“all that sets
the text in relationship, whether obvious or concealed, with other text” –
Gerard Genette - 14
Paratextuality indicates the
presence of material around the primary text, but in which the text is
embedded: the framing acts of title, subtitle, preface, illustration, book
covers, dust jackets, and the setting of the book which is dependent on
external conditions, which the readers cannot ignore. – 14
Metatextuality moves outward to
consider the effects of commentary and critical relationships posed between one
text and others. – 14
Hypertextuality indicates a
level of dependence between texts: Text B is unable to exist without Text A. –
14
architextuality indicates a
general classification of the text or object that must result from
paratextuality. In other words, the library classification of a text with call
letters such as PR or an HQ depends on the degree to which the text is like
other texts. – 14
II. Peirce on
Semiotics
Peirce’s
conviction was phenomenological: Things exist in reality outside of what we
perceive or think about them. – 15
Three theories of
sign emerge in his [Peirce] philosophy of logic as semiotics, and each of these
theories is parsed in detail, but the one that is used most frequently by
rhetoricians to discuss both language and images is the triadic theory of icon,
index, and symbol. Peirce’s distinctions are useful to rhetoricians because
they establish a formal terminology for considering different types of
imagistic sign systems, from representational, through diagrammatical, to
allegorical. – 15
Two levels of
terminology establish the relationship of sign to referent. At the first level,
Peirce contended that a sign stands for an object; it “tells about” its object.
He gave this sign the name representamen. The representamen is
rhetorical; it “addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person
an equivalent sign is called the “interpretant”. The interpretant
represents an idea that Peirce called “the ground of the representation.” The interpretant
is thus a mental representation; it is not a person. Thus, both representamen
and interpretant relate to the same object. – 15
The icon may be
abstract or representational; it possesses a character that makes it
significant. A vacation photograph and Charles Schultz’s Snoopy are icons, but
so is a pencil streak indicating a geometric line. The Object does not have to
exist, for it is easy enough to visually represent and alien from “outer space”
or a solar system even though we have not seen either. Peirce refers to the
icon as an image. – 15
The index, on the
other hand, depends on the existence of the Object to have left what Jacques
Derrida, in Dissemination, would later call a “trance”. Therefore, the
indexical image holds an existential relationship to its Object and often
raises in the viewer a memory of a similar Object. The classical example of an
indexical sign is a bullet hole. The interpretant indicates, “here is a hole in
the front door” and relates the hole to the other holes, but not to the Object
(a bullet making a hole) because the object – the bullet and the gun – are
missing. In Roland Barthes’ words, the index “points but does not tell”. Peirce
describes the index as a diagram. – 16
The symbol is the
most abstract of the three sign types. It depends on the interpretant,
that is, the mental representation in the mind’s eye. Therefore, the symbolic
image holds a conventional relationship to its object that is not contingent on
resemblance. […] Peirce calls the symbol a metaphor. – 16
III. Barthes on
Signs
According to
Saussure, understanding is established by difference; practically speaking, we
understand cat because cat is different from dog. The
names are merely arbitrary, established by social and linguistic convention, rather
than having any existential link to the object itself. – 16-17
Visual Rhetoric,
An Indiscipline